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The NBA, Exit Discrimination, and Career Earnings
HA HOANG and DAN RASCHER*
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, it complements the many wage dis-
crimination studies by examining exit discrimination in the NBA using a deca-
de’s worth of data (the 1980s). White players have a 36 percent lower risk of
being cut than black players, ceteris paribus, translating into an expected career
length of 7.5 seasons for an apparently similar player who is white and 5.5 sea-
sons for the same player who is black. Second, the career earnings effect of exit
discrimination in the 1980s is larger ($808,000) than the career earnings effect
of wage discrimination ($329,000). Third, our data are consistent with the
hypothesis that customer racial discrimination is the reason for the observed exit
discrimination.
Introduction
Within the literature on labor market discrimination, most researchers
have focused on the conditions under which otherwise identical workers
receive different wages.1 Yet, in addition to such wage discrimination,
Becker (1971) notes that employment discrimination also can occur at the
points of job entry, promotion, and exit. Workers can be denied opportuni-
ties at each part of the labor market process that result in differential life-
time earnings. This study focuses on exit discrimination, defined as the
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involuntary dismissal of workers based on the preferences of employers,
coworkers, or customers. Because it provides fine-grained measures of
individual productivity, we examine exit discrimination among black and
white players in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Using salary
data from the league, we show that, in fact, the effect of exit discrimina-
tion on career earnings is greater than that due to wage discrimination.
While attention to promotion and hiring discrimination has been long-
standing, the focus on exit discrimination has only recently received theo-
retical and empirical attention.2 In an analysis of current population statis-
tics (CPS) tenure supplements for 1983, 1987, and 1991, Diebold,
Neumark, and Polsky (1994) showed that there was a decline in the reten-
tion rates of black relative to white workers, whereas all other subgroups
experienced no such declines. According to Swinnerton and Wial (1995),
retention, as a function of tenure, has an inverted-U shape for both black
and white workers and for workers in nonprofessional services, a cate-
gory that includes the entertainment industry. Their study covers the
1979–1991 period and uses the CPS tenure supplements from 1979, 1981,
1983, 1987, and 1991.3
While the results are suggestive, one difficulty that these studies face is
an inability to distinguish empirically between voluntary and involuntary
job separation. This is critical because, unlike involuntary quits, voluntary
quits may not be the result of discriminatory employers, coworkers, or
customers but rather are based on differing preferences. Hence we turn to
the sports labor market to focus solely on the effects of involuntary turn-
over. Because of the extremely high opportunity costs of quitting the
NBA, turnover among professional basketball players is predominantly
involuntary. Kahn (1991) states that “considering the high incomes
earned by professional athletes, it seems likely that much turnover among
them is involuntary.”4
Another more general criticism of empirical studies of discrimination
in the labor market is the difficulty of operationalizing individual ability
or productivity. A similar shortcoming of empirical analyses in this area
has been the omission of critical but difficult to measure characteristics
70 / HA HOANG AND DAN RASCHER
2 See Brown et al. (1997, chap. 2) for a recent review of quit behavior studies.
3 This is consistent with our findings of a U-shaped unconditional hazard function for NBA players.
However, as shown in Figure 1, when we estimated the hazard function conditional on productivity, the
shape changed significantly. Swinnerton and Wial (1995) do not perform this type of analysis.
4 If some turnover is voluntary, one might expect to find higher retirement rates for whites. Whites would
be more likely to quit because of greater employment opportunities inside and outside the sport. If there is a
difference in quit rates, we argue that a greater tendency for voluntary retirement among white players is
likely to bias our effects downward, thereby providing a conservative test of exit discrimination.
that are related to worker productivity (Allison, 1983). An omitted vari-
able such as “quality of prior work experience,” for example, can inflate
the differential effect of race or sex on earnings, hiring, promotion, or exit
rates. In light of these difficulties, the availability of detailed performance
measures in sports alleviates the problem of biased results due to mis-
measurement or correlation of errors with race and can get us closer to a
state of the world where, in Becker’s terms, a “taste for discrimination”
can be discerned between different racial groups of otherwise equal abil-
ity (Becker, 1971).
For these reasons, many researchers have turned to the sports labor
market in order to test for evidence of discrimination. In a number of
sports, evidence for wage discrimination by race has been found.5 In par-
ticular, Kahn (1991), in a survey of the literature, found that the wage gap
in basketball is between 11 percent and 25 percent against black players.
Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991), and Kahn and Sherer (1988) both
examined wage and entry discrimination in the NBA. No entry effect was
found, but tests of a differential wage effect were significant. Extending
this literature, our study enables a comparison to be made between the
career earnings effect of wage and exit discrimination.
Similarly, Jiobu (1988) determined that black baseball players had sig-
nificantly higher exit rates than their white counterparts from 1971 to
1985.6 He used race, age, playing position, and three measures of total
career performance to examine exit discrimination. No numerical inter-
pretation is offered regarding the extent of exit discrimination, no reason
for it is analyzed, and no effect on career earnings is mentioned.
With explicit attention to exit discrimination, Johnson and Marple
(1973) found that white benchwarmers had longer careers than black
benchwarmers in the NBA using data from the 1970 season. They rank
players based on points scored per game and use a comparison of means
by race. No other controls are included. Because of the methodology
used, the amount of discrimination is difficult to determine in their study.
We extend these studies by gathering better productivity data (eight
annual measures of performance for eleven seasons) as well as more
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5 See Hill and Spellman (1984) and Cymrot (1983) for baseball; Kahn and Sherer (1988), Koch and Van-
der Hill (1988), Wallace (1988), and Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991) for basketball; Mogull (1973) and
Kahn (1992) for football; and Walsh etal. (1988) and Jones and Walsh (1988) for hockey.
6 Sam Jethroe, the 1950 Major League Baseball National League Rookie of the Year, alleged that racial
discrimination had shortened his career. On October 4, 1996, a federal court ruled the claim was barred by
the statute of limitations (Contra Costa Times, October 6, 1996). The relevance is that he is not eligible for
pension benefits because his career was not long enough. Another baseball example comes from an article
in the San Francisco Chronicle on April 15, 1997. Black players believe that “the average black player is
more likely to be released in favor of a white player of relatively equal skills.”
extensive information on alternative factors that could affect the decision
to retain players: injuries, trades, team record, and draft number. We also
employ the more methodologically appropriate technique of event-history
analysis to test for differential exit rates for black versus white players.
Additionally, the effect on career earnings is assessed along with analyses
that suggest customer preferences play an important role.
As Kahn (1991) noted in his survey of the literature, there was evidence
of customer or fan preferences as a determinant of some forms of dis-
crimination in the NBA. Kahn and Sherer (1988) show that fan attendance
is affected by team racial composition. Having more white players on a
team results in greater turnout. Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991) report
that there is evidence of “geographical sorting by race”; i.e., there is a
high correlation between the racial composition of teams and their corre-
sponding cities. A deeper look into customer discrimination by Burdekin
and Idson (1991) reveals that not only is higher attendance associated
with increases in the percentage of white players on a team but that the
matching of team to city racial composition also increases attendance, at
the margin.
Customer-based discrimination has received little attention because
few goods could be identified as being white or black produced. Hence
much of the focus has been on employer and coworker discrimination as
likely sources of the disparities in wages and income levels that are
observed between blacks and whites in the general labor market (Cain,
1986). Kahn (1991) argued, however, that customer discrimination may
be more prevalent in sports than in the general labor market because pro-
fessional sports are in the public eye, where there is contact between fans
and players. In a context where the majority of employees are black, he
hypothesized that fans place a premium on watching white players.
Indeed, he suggested that this premium may have increased as the total
percentage of whites in the league decreased from approximately 42 per-
cent in the early 70s to roughly 20 percent in the 1980s. Following the
work of Burdekin and Idson (1991), we test a model of customer discrimi-
nation by examining the influence of team racial composition on fan
attendance. We test a longer period of time, control for the autocorrelation
present in these types of data, and add an index of the availability of sub-
stitute products that is shown to be an important determinant of the
demand for NBA contests.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: The development of a
theory of customer-driven exit discrimination is included in the second
section. The next section contains the event-history analysis of exit rates
in the NBA. The estimate of expected career length, its effects on career
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earnings, and a test of customer discrimination appear in the fourth sec-
tion. A summary of the results and their implications constitutes the
final section.
Theory
The standard theory of discrimination asserts that competition may
remove coworker or employer wage discrimination but not customer
discrimination. Further, customer discrimination is more likely to occur
in service industries (where there is consumer-producer contact) than in
manufacturing, all else equal. Because consumers know exactly who the
producers are, the NBA epitomizes this aspect of a service industry.
Given the significant body of evidence showing wage discrimination in
the NBA, the purpose of this section is to develop a theory of customer
discrimination that allows for both wage and exit discrimination to
coexist. Suppose (1) that customers demand a combination of talent and
white players because of their desire to see winning teams and their dis-
crimination against black players. Further, assume (2) that the pool of
available talent with sufficient skill is becoming increasingly black.
Thus there are two opposing forces at work that lead to an optimal
number of black players on a team, assuming a diminishing marginal
revenue product of the number of white players on a team. First, employ
as many black players as possible to capitalize on their relative abun-
dance. Second, employ as many white players as possible to satisfy cus-
tomer preferences.
For a typical NBA team, let Q = Q(T, nw), where Q is the demand for the
games played by this team. T is total team talent and is defined as T = nwTw
+ nbTb, where nw and nb are the number of white and black players on the
team, respectively, and Tw and Tb are their average talent levels. Further,
N, the total number of players on the team, is fixed by the league and is
defined as N = nw + nb. The argument nw is in the demand function because
it represents the fans’ preferences for watching white players.
An owner chooses the amount of talent and team racial composition
that maximizes profits “pii. Explicitly, ”pii = PQ(T, nw) – (wwnwTw + wbnbTb),
where P is the ticket price and is assumed constant and ww and wb are the
white and black wage per unit of talent, respectively. The resulting equi-
librium condition is
(1)
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MRPT [defined as ] is the marginal revenue product of talent
and is assumed to be positive but decreasing. [defined as
is the marginal revenue product of the fraction of white play-
ers on the team and is assumed to be positive and decreasing up to a cer-
tain nw. This is the effect of including the first exogenous factor into the
model; fans discriminate based on race.7
As Kahn (1991) indicates, there is a wage gap, ranging from 11 percent
to 25 percent, that favors white players in the NBA. Equation (1) shows
that there is a white wage premium that comes directly from customer
preferences for white players. In other words, a white player of compara-
ble ability to a black player receives an income in excess of the black
income [i.e., (ww – wb)T] by an amount equal to the effect that their race
has on the attendance decisions of fans In equilibrium, the owner
hires the number of white players that causes Eq. (1) to be true.
To satisfy the fans, there is a minimum number of white players on a
team. The second assumption, that the pool of quality available talent
is becoming increasingly black, causes the annual replacement of
players with rookies to occur mostly among black players. The white
players have longer careers simply because there are fewer qualified
white rookies to replace them, whereas the black players are con-
stantly being cycled in and out of the league.8 The exit discrimination
is caused by the biased preferences of fans (assumption 1) but is
heightened by the fact that the pool of available rookies is mostly
black and increasing (assumption 2).9
This theory, like any other, is dependent on its assumptions. The fourth
section tests the validity of assumption 1. For assumption 2, we note that
the percentage of players drafted who are black has grown from 58 per-
cent to 80 percent over the last two decades, which is in line with the
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MRPnw
∂ ∂Q nwa f]
7 It is possible that the demand maximizing number of white players on a team is greater than N, the total
number of players on the team. This depends on the magntitude of the marginal attendance decisions of
white and black fans.
8 When there are a lot of white players on a team, as was the case in the early 70s, the replacement of a
white player with a black player has little effect on attendance and thus wages. As the team approaches the
critical minimum number of white players, each white player represents a larger proportion of the white
players on the team, and his removal has a larger effect on attendance and therefore wages. Counter to what
might be expected, the real effects of discrimination are likely to be increasing in the NBA as the transition
to the equilibrium occurs.
9 The theory also predicts that the team racial composition may affect the hazard rate in one of two ways.
Black players on a team with many black players might have an increased chance of being fired because the
team is approaching the critical minimum number of white players. On the other hand, a particular black
player on a team with many black players may be less likely to be the one who is replaced from the pool of
available talent. Thus the direction of the effect is indeterminant.
MRPnw.
nw
*
P Q T∂ ∂a f
growth in the percentage of college players who are black.10 Thus the pool
of qualified talent has become increasingly black.11
If the two assumptions are true empirically, what are their implications
for the data analysis that follows? The theory distinguishes between the
following two hypotheses. The null hypothesis is that if performance is
the sole criterion that earnings and employment decisions are based on,
then there should be no difference between wages and hazard rates across
races.12 The alternative hypothesis is that if race matters, wages will be
lower and hazard rates will be higher for black players as compared with
equally talented white players.
Exit Discrimination
The Data. The sample includes all players selected in the first two
rounds of the 1980–1986 NBA draft.13 We restricted the sample to those
who received a contract and played at least 1 year in the NBA. Of those
who were excluded, 53 players did not receive a contract and 1 player
played in Europe only to return to the NBA for 1 year. We followed the
remaining 275 players’ careers until they were cut from the league or until
the 1990–1991 season, the last year for which data were obtained. During
the time frame of this study, 184 of the 275 players in this sample were
eventually cut from the league.
Using player photographs available from the Official NBA Guide
(1980–1991), we coded the race of each player in the sample; 51 of the
275 players are white. In addition, player position, performance statistics,
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10 In 1993, black athletes formed 27.5 percent of the division I athletes (all sports, not just basketball), up
from 23.6 percent in 1986 (Blum, 1995).
11 Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to understand the causes for the increase in
the number of blacks in the pool of available talent. Harry Edwards suggests that it “began with the integra-
tion of blacks into mainstream professional sports,” which continues today, but is further urged along by the
media’s “elevation of black professional athletes to the status of role models/heroes/celebrities and the
black community’s association of these images with making it” (Edwards, 1994). “The almost universal
perception that sport, among all American institutions, offers African-Americans unique socioeconomic
and career advancement opportunities has prompted black parents to be four times more likely than white
parents to view their children’s participation in sport not as mere recreation, but as a start down the road to a
professional sports career. Similarly, black parents are more likely than white parents to see their children’s
sports participation as a potential economic mobility vehicle for the entire family” (Edwards, 1992).
12 In a race-blind world, would be zero, a larger proportion of the players in the league would be
black, and wages would be based solely on talent. This implies that the number of teams with only black
players should be lower in the discrimination than in the null setting. Given our data, the expected number
of all-black teams is about 5.4, whereas the actual number is 4, so the sign is as expected, but the difference
is not statistically significant.
13 Players who were selected beyond the second round were rarely offered contracts. In 1989, the NBA
itself finally narrowed down the number of rounds to two.
MRPn w
number of games played, team record, and detailed information on player
injuries and trades were collected from The Official NBA Encyclopedia
(1989) and The Sports Encyclopedia (1991).
Player position is included as a control variable in order to account for
the relative scarcity and greater difficulty that teams face in replacing
their taller players. Because taller players typically occupy the center and
forward positions, we divided players into two positions: center/forward
and guard (the reference category). We expect centers and forwards to
have a lower risk of exiting than the guards, who are generally smaller.
Scoring, assists, steals, rebounding, and blocks are used as measures of
each player’s ability on the court. Since these performance statistics may
depend on how much playing time a player receives, the performance
measures are divided by the number of minutes played during the season.
The number of games played during the regular season is also included as
a separate control. Free throw shooting and field goal shooting are entered
as percentages and serve as additional measures of scoring ability.
A player’s performance and the length of his career may be affected by
the occurrence of injuries. A dummy variable, injury, accounts for the
presence of any one of 14 types of injury or illness. The extent of the
injury is controlled for by combining it with games played.
A possible influence on a player’s career length is the likelihood of
being traded, which is measured by the number of trades during his
career. Most player trades occur during the interim season as players
become free agents and teams try to rebuild their roster and vie for future
top draft picks. The effect of being traded was analyzed along with the
subsequent year’s performance on the rate of exit. The direction of the
effect is not clear because trades could breathe new life into a player’s
career if the player is sent to a team that has a greater need for his services.
However, being traded also can signal a player’s declining ability, thereby
leading to a decrease in playing time on the new team.
Team record, expressed as the percentage of games won during the
regular season, is included. Because poorly performing teams often
undergo major roster changes in order to improve their performance,
players might be at greater risk for being cut as losing teams attempt to
rebuild.
A player’s draft number is the order in which a player was taken in the
NBA draft. It is included in the analysis as a measure of a team’s financial
commitment to a player and as a measure of the player’s expected future
performance; earlier draft picks receive larger salaries in their contracts
and are expected to be top performers. These contracts represent a sunk
cost incurred by the drafting team that have been shown to affect career
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length such that, controlling for performance and other factors, players
who were picked earlier in the draft were found to have a significantly
lower risk of being cut from the league (Staw and Hoang, 1995). Conse-
quently, we include draft order in this analysis and expect to replicate this
finding.
Because the risk of being cut from the NBA can be expected to change
with the number of years (seasons) a player has already spent in the
league, tenure in the NBA is also included. The tenure “clock” stopped,
however, for some players who left to play for teams in Europe, since per-
formance measures are not available for those years. The clock restarted
when they returned to the NBA.
Methods. Examining survival in the NBA poses several challenges to
standard regression techniques. First, there is no satisfactory way of han-
dling right-censored cases, i.e., the group of players for which the event of
being cut from the league is not observed within the time period of the
study. Conducting a logistic regression on a categorical dependent vari-
able that distinguishes those who were cut and those who were not cut
would retain information from both groups. However, logistic regression
is unsatisfying because it cannot incorporate the effect of duration or time
spent in the state prior to the occurrence of the event. The effect of dura-
tion, measured by length of tenure in the NBA, is particularly important
because we would expect that a player’s risk of exiting will change the
longer he remains in the league.
Finally, ordinary regression techniques are problematic because they
cannot easily incorporate changes in the values of the explanatory vari-
ables over time. Creating performance variables for every year spent in
the league for up to 12 years would be very cumbersome and introduce
problems of multicollinearity.
In order to address each of these challenges, we use event-history
analysis to examine how race influences the risk of being cut from the
NBA. The model of the survival process using this framework would
explicitly include (1) both those who were and were not cut from the
league, (2) information on duration, and (3) explanatory variables that can
vary over time.
The dependent variable in event-history analysis is the hazard rate. The
hazard rate is interpreted as the probability of exiting the NBA during the
time interval t to t + ∆t, given that the individual is at risk for being cut at
time t (Petersen, 1995). Dividing the probability by ∆t and letting ∆t → 0
give us the more precise formulation of the hazard rate expressed as an
instantaneous rate of transition:
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(2)
We specify a piecewise constant rate model in which the estimated
rates are modeled as a function of performance, team performance, and
number of years spent in the league. This model is extremely flexible
because, while it forces the estimated rate to stay constant within each
period, the rate is allowed to vary arbitrarily between periods.14 The effect
of tenure is captured by nine dummies, one for each year spent in the
league. The last dummy captures the effect of remaining in the league for
9 or more years. The hazard rate function can be expressed as
(3)
where λ is the hazard rate or risk that a player is cut from the NBA, α is a
constant, X is the vector of time-constant variables such as draft number
and race, X(t) is the vector of time-dependent variables such as perform-
ance that are updated each year, and Tj are the time dummies. β1, β2, and γj
are the coefficient vectors to be estimated.
Results. Black and white players do not differ greatly in terms of their
performance levels. The correlations are shown in Table 1 and differences
by race in Table 2. Two performance measures are modestly correlated
with race. White NBA players have lower steals per minute and points
scored per minute than their black counterparts (r = –0.17, p < .01; r =
–0.11, p < .01). White players are also more likely than black players to
play the center/forward position (r = 0.1, p < 0.1). As a group, white play-
ers also were traded more often (24 percent more per player) and suffered
more injuries than black players (14 percent more injuries per player). In
an analysis of the means, Table 2 shows that blacks and whites differed in
the average number of seasons spent in the NBA. Of those who exited
during the time span of the study, white players were cut on average after
5.43 seasons in the league, whereas blacks were cut after 4.08 seasons.
The correlations also show that a variety of the performance measures
are collinear. For example, rebounds are correlated with blocks, and steals
are correlated with assists. This is not surprising, since the measures cap-
ture a number of underlying defensive and offensive skills associated with
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14 The results were not significantly different using a Gompertz model in which the log of the hazard rate
could increase or decrease linearly with time.
λ α β β γ= + + +exp 1 2X X t Tj ja f
λ t
P t T t t T t
tt
a f b g= < < + >
→
lim
∆
∆
∆0
TABLE1
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (N = 1455)
Intercorrelation
Meaj hn SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 112 13 14
1 Center/forward 0.70 0.46 1.00
2 Free throws 71.74 15.00 −0.19b 1.00
3 Field goals 46.63 7.79 0.15b 0.20b 1.00
4 Assists 0.09 0.07 −0.67b 0.29b −0.02 1.00
5 Rebounds 0.18 0.08 0.58b −0.24b 0.26b −0.53b 1.00
6 Steals 0.04 0.02 −0.33b 0.07c 0.00 0.40b −0.08b 1.00
7 Blocks 0.02 0.02 0.42b −0.19b 0.15b −0.38b 0.50b −0.22b 1.00
8 Points scored 0.43 0.14 0.05 0.41b 0.41b 0.04 0.00 0.14b −0.09b 1.00
9 Injury 0.08 0.27 0.00 −0.03 −0.10b 0.00 −0.01 −0.05 −0.02 −0.03 1.00
10 Trade 0.15 0.36 0.01 −0.02 −0.09b −0.03 −0.06c −0.01 −0.06c −0.12b −0.02 1.00
11 Games 63.52 22.69 0.00 0.39b 0.44b 0.11b 0.07b 0.03 0.08b 0.29b −0.30b −0.15b 1.00c
12 Team record 49.45 14.37 0.06 0.01 0.09b −0.02 0.02 −0.02 0.04 0.06c −0.04 −0.09b 0.07b 1.00
13 Draft number 17.96 12.16 −0.04 −0.16b −0.16b −0.04 −0.06c 0.07b −0.05c −0.34b −0.05 0.09b −0.26b −0.03b 1.00
14 Tenurea 3.94 2.46 0.03 0.13b 0.04 0.02 −0.03 −0.08b −0.01 0.10b 0.09b 0.17b 0.06c 0.10 −0.17b 1.00
15 Race 0.22 0.41 0.10b 0.08b 0.01 −0.05c 0.05c −0.17b 0.00 −0.11b − 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06a 0.01 0.05
a Time dummies are converted to a continuous variable.
b p < .01, two-tailed.
c p < .05, two-tailed.
the different positions on a team. Centers and forwards, for instance, have
higher rebounds per minute and blocks per minute than the other posi-
tions (r =.58, p < .01, two-tailed test; r = .42, p < .01, two-tailed test).
While the relationships across the performance measures are to be
expected, multicollinearity presents two problems for the subsequent
event-history analysis. First, standard errors of the performance measures
are likely to be inflated, thereby leading to a higher probability of incor-
rectly accepting the null hypothesis of no effect (a type II error). Another
consequence of multicollinearity is the sensitivity of the estimates and the
standard errors to changes in the model. In our analyses, we found that the
injury variable became significant, while the trade variable became insig-
nificant when the number of games played was included in the analysis.
Because of the high collinearity, the effects of trade and injury should be
interpreted with caution. Despite the problem of multicollinearity, how-
ever, we decided to include all the measures in the event-history analysis
in order to conduct the most conservative test of player race as a predictor
of exit rates.
The results of the event-history analysis using the piecewise constant
rate model appear in Table 3. In the total sample, 184 players were cut
from the league. Therefore, the annual proportional hazard rate for drop-
ping out of the NBA was 0.13. The full model with control variables and
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES BY PLAYER RACE
Blacks Whites
Totals
Number of players 224 51
Percentage of center forwards 67% 78%
Percentage of guards 33% 22%
Means
Free throw percentage 0.71 0.74
Field goal percentage 0.47 0.47
Assists/minute 0.10 0.09
Rebounds/minute 0.18 0.19
Steals/minute 0.04 0.03
Blocks/minute 0.02 0.02
Points/minute 0.44 0.40
Winning percentage of team 48.98 51.09
Draft number 17.88 18.22
Percent black on team 0.76 0.68
Games played 63.42 63.86
Instances of being injured 0.41 0.47
Instances of being traded 0.76 1.00
Tenurea 4.08 5.43
a Mean tenure of players who were cut (not right-censored).
draft number offered a significantly better fit than the null model (χ2 =
223.73, 22 d.f., p < .01).
Controlling for performance and team characteristics, there is strong
evidence of higher exit rates for black than white players in the NBA (β =
–0.45, p < .05, one-tailed test).15 In order to make the coefficient meaning-
ful, it must be exponentiated and converted into a percentage using
100[exp(β) – 1]. This calculation gives us the percentage difference in the
hazard rate between whites and blacks, the omitted category (Allison,
1983). Using this method, white players have a 36 percent lower hazard
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TABLE 3
THE EFFECT OF RACE ON THE RATE OF EXIT FROM THE NBA
β
Center/forwards −1.06
Free throw percentage 0.05
Field goal percentage 0.02
Assists/minute −11.54
Rebounds/minute 2.46
Steals/minute −13.82
Block/minute −51.72
Points/minute −13.59a
Instances of being injured −6.10a
Instances of being traded 2.26
Games played −0.31c
Winning percentage of team −0.06
Draft number 0.21b
Race −4.45a
Year 2 0.73
Year 3 0.68
Year 4 3.34
Year 5 2.88
Year 6 2.96
Year 7 1.50
Year 8 9.34b
Year 9+ 8.00b
Intercept −4.02
Number of events 184
Number of one-year spells 1,455
χ2 223.73
Note: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 10.
a p < 0.05, one-tailed.
b p < 0.01, one-tailed.
c p < 0.001, one-tailed.
15 Team racial composition was insignificant and had no effect on the other variables when it was
included in the hazard analysis (see footnote 2).
FIGURE 1
Estimated Hazard Rate for Black and White Players
FIGURE 2
Survival Functions for Black and White Players (with standard errors)
rate than black players of being cut from the league16 (Fig. 1). As a result,
they have a higher survival rate than black players (Fig. 2).
The effects of the other variables are also of interest.17 Only one per-
formance statistic, points scored per minute, significantly affected the
hazard rate for career mortality (β = –1.36, p < .05, one-tailed t test).
Games played in the regular season had a strong effect on the hazard rate
(β = –.03, p < .001, one-tailed t test). The other performance measures
may be insignificant due to multicollinearity (see Table 1). For example,
when the number of games played is excluded from the model, the effect
of being traded and the performance measure blocks per minute become
significant.
An injured player is less likely to be cut than an uninjured one, perhaps
because the coach has not had time to evaluate the player (β = –.6, p < .05,
one-tailed t test).18
As predicted, a later draft number has a positive effect on the hazard
rate (β = .02, p < .01, one-tailed t test), which is consistent with Staw and
Hoang (1995). Finally, as the positive coefficients on the year dummy
variables indicate, the risk of being cut increases over time.19
Customer Discrimination
The data are consistent with the theory that not only do white players
earn a higher salary, but they also have longer careers than comparable
black players. The theory is based on the assumption that customers
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16 It is possible that career length may differ across races because one race may have longer guarantees in
their contracts. The cost of firing a worker with a guaranteed contract includes the salary, whereas firing a
worker without a guarantee does not. Thus players with contract guarantees, which may vary by race, are
likely to have longer careers. What this study may end up measuring is not whether black players are dis-
criminated against in employment decisions, but whether they are discriminated against in contract deci-
sions. This is just as important a measure of discrimination as exit discrimination, just earlier along in the
process.
17 Possibly the general manager and/or coach may make employment decisions based on their own racial
preferences as opposed to those of their customers. A test concluded that the race of general managers and
coaches is not associated with the hazard rate. We also found that the salary cap and free agency had no sig-
nificant effect on the hazard rate.
18 To control for the intensity of an injury, an interaction term of injury and the number of games played
was tested but was not significant.
19 An increase in the hazard rate over time is strong evidence against the argument that unobserved het-
erogeneity in the sample of players is producing this time-dependent effect. Typically, differences between
individuals in our sample that are not taken into account in the model would cause individuals at greater risk
of being cut from the league to drop out earlier than those at less risk. If the argument for unobserved hetero-
geneity were true, we would expect a declining hazard function over time. While it is often difficult to deter-
mine whether a declining hazard rate is an artifact of unobserved differences, an increasing rate over time is
strong evidence for a time-dependent effect.
prefer watching white players. The following tests suggest the presence of
customer prejudice.
All else being equal, employer discrimination would lead to a team
racial composition that represents the racial preferences of the team deci-
sion makers: the owner, the general manager, and the coach. On the other
hand, the preferences of the fans would determine the team racial makeup
if customer discrimination existed. To distinguish between employer and
customer discrimination, the relationship between the race of the decision
maker (approximated by coach and general manager race), the race of
potential fans (approximated by city racial composition), and the racial
composition of the team is analyzed.20
Following Burdekin and Idson (1991), we examine whether the racial
composition of the basketball teams in turn affects fan attendance.
Because fan turnout is an important source of revenue, we focus on atten-
dance in order to show that management must be concerned with both
team performance and team racial composition in order to maximize
ticket revenue.21
Data and Methods. In the first analysis, the percentage of white play-
ers on each team is modeled as a function of the percentage of whites liv-
ing in the metropolitan area of the stadium, the race of the coach, and the
race of the general manager. Information on the racial composition of
each team was provided by Robert McCormick and Robert Tollison, who
used the names listed on team rosters to identify the players using the
Official NBA Guide and the Official NBA Register.
The racial composition of the city was defined as the percent of the
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) that was white in the area
in which the team was located. SMSA data were obtained from the 1980
and 1990 Census. Because the percentage white changed little from the
first point of observation to the second (the maximum difference was
Miami, which saw a 3.6 percent rise in its black population), city racial
composition was imputed for 1980–1989 with 1980 SMSA data, while
the remaining years were imputed with 1990 SMSA data. Hence much of
the variation explained by the SMSA data was constrained to be across
teams rather than within teams. The race of the coach and general man-
ager were obtained from the Official NBA Guide.
In the second analysis, fan attendance is modeled as a function of the
ratio of the racial composition of the team to that in the surrounding city,
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20 All owners except one were white during this time period.
21 Reported ticket price data are fairly uniform across teams.
team winning percentage, the total population of the area, arena capacity,
and a recreation index to account for alternative entertainment goods.22
The ratio of percentage white on a team to percentage white in the city
(ranging from 0.08 to 0.77) is used because an increase in the ratio
implies an increase in the racial match between the team and the city. We
obtained from Quirk and Fort (1992) the annual home attendance for each
team in the league from 1980 to 1991, the arena capacity from each
team’s World Wide Web homepage, and the recreation index from Places
Rated Almanac (1989).23
Results. Consistent with the hypothesis of customer discrimination, we
found that city racial composition was a significant predictor of team racial
composition. As Table 4 indicates, the higher the fraction of whites in a city,
the higher is the fraction of whites on the team (β = .67, p < .01). Further-
more, race of the coach was marginally significant, whereas race of the gen-
eral manager was not significant. Our theory also predicts that teams with a
higher number of black players should perform better on average because
some of the white players are still playing, in part, because of their race. The
correlation of team winning percentage and the fraction of players on a team
that are black is positive, as expected, but insignificant.
It is possible that a match between team and city racial composition
could be induced by supply instead of demand, as we predict. Black play-
ers may desire to live in cities with a greater fraction of blacks. Before
1983, during the reserve clause period, there were no individual supply
decisions because each team owned the property rights of its players.
Thus labor demand determined team racial composition. With the adop-
tion of limited free agency in 1984, players who met certain criteria could
negotiate to play on any team. These players could forgo higher salaries in
favor of living in preferred metropolitan areas. Empirically, this implies
that there should be a greater correlation between team and city racial
composition after 1983. The estimated equations for the two different
periods are virtually identical. Perhaps players’ preferences are in line
with team demands, or they are swamped by the higher salaries attribut-
able to satisfying team demands.24
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22 In previous studies, price and income data were found to be unimportant determinants of demand for
sports contests, possibly because of the uniformity of the price variable.
23 Due to autocorrelation, an AR(1) process is used that results in serially uncorrelated errors.
24 A reviewer suggested that another way of bolstering this result would be to see how attendance at home
games varied with the race of the opposing team. We agree, but unfortunately, most games in the NBA are
sellouts; thus there wouldn’t be any variation to explain. However, Rascher (1997) shows that if the visiting
team’s pitcher in Major League Baseball is black, attendance is lowered by about 1500 fans, all else equal.
Given that there is a relationship between team racial composition and
that of the local population, what is the return for doing this? In other
words, how is attendance affected by the team racial composition? In the
second analysis, the ratio of team racial composition to city racial compo-
sition was in turn found to be related to the fan attendance level. As pre-
sented in Table 5, replacing a black player with a white player (holding
city racial composition constant) increases attendance by over 15,000,
about a 3 percent rise above average attendance (β = 163,103, p < .001).25
As expected, one more win increases attendance by 4530 (β = 371, 469, p
< .001). Because about 20 percent of the team-seasons were sold out,
arena capacity had a significant effect on seasonal attendance. The addi-
tion of 100 extra seats throughout the season (about 2.4 per game)
increased seasonal attendance by about 47 (β = .470, p < .001).26 A
decrease in the recreation index (fewer alternative recreation opportuni-
ties) by 1 standard deviation moves an average city from fifteenth place
among NBA cities to twenty-sixth place and coincides with an increase in
attendance by 11,432.
The race of the coach and the general manager had no effect in the cus-
tomer discrimination analysis. The results show that customer prefer-
ences to watch white players significantly affect the employment
decisions of team general managers and coaches.
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TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF WHITE PLAYERS ON A TEAM
Dependent variable Percent white on team
Goodness of fit (R2) .132042
Adjusted R2 .121282
F statistic (zero slopes) 12.2718
Number of observations 246
Estimate Standard Error t Statistic
Constant −.312130 .096949 −3.21952
Percent white in SMSA .666987 .110725 6.02380
Coach is black −.035907 .023541 −1.52528
General manager is black −.052971 .052229 −1.01421
25 The theory predicts that increases in the percentage white on a team will increase attendance, but at a
decreasing rate. Attendance is increased, but not necessarily at a decreasing rate; i.e., the ratio-squared term
was not significant and, further, removed the significance of the ratio itself.
26 The population variable is insignificant due to its correlation with arena capacity. Larger population
centers have larger arenas.
Discussion
Career Earnings Effect. Up to this point, we have shown that there is sig-
nificant exit discrimination against blacks in the NBA and that it is consis-
tent with customer discrimination. What are the magnitudes of these effects
on total career earnings? Figure 3 shows the effect on career earnings of exit
and wage discrimination for an average player, controlling for performance.
The line with the white (black) squares is the predicted pay for an average
player who is white (black). The vertical line at 7.5 (5.5) years represents the
expected career length of a typical player who is white (black). Area A
measures the wage discrimination effect on career earnings. Due to wage
discrimination, a typical player who is white will earn about $329,000 more
than the same player who is black up to the expected end of the black play-
er’s career. Area C denotes the salary foregone by the black player from the
exit discrimination effect of 2 years, assuming that wage discrimination is
still in effect for those 2 years. A white player will earn $808,000 more than
a black player attributable to exit discrimination. Area B represents the extra
salary difference from wage discrimination if exit discrimination did not
exist at all, allowing a black player to play 7.5 years instead of just 5.5. The
value of area B is about $185,000.27
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TABLE 5
AR(1) ANALYSIS OF FAN ATTENDANCE
Dependent varaible Attendance
R2 0.45
Number of observations 235
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.14
Estimate Standard Error t Statistic
Constant −3213 54973 −0.058
Arena capacity for the season 0.470 .0528 8.90
Percent white on team ÷ percent white in city 163103 52039.5 3.13
Winning percentage 371469 49199.5 7.55
Population (thousands) −2.45 2.15 −1.14
Recreation index (higher means more) −14.11 8.56 −1.65
27 The methodology used to calculate the wage-tenure profiles is as follows. First, we took the predicted
pay equations from the first column of Table 2 of Kahn and Sherer (1988) and plugged in the average data of
the rookie years for all 275 players in our sample, thus creating the predicted pay for rookies at the
1985–1986 price level (that used by Kahn and Sherer). Second, we deflated the predicted pay to 1980 dol-
lars by using the annual average salary data for all NBA players from Figure 6.1 in Quirk and Fort (1992).
We did this to have our profile begin the same year as our sample, 1980. Third, the white (black) predicted
For NBA players beginning their career in 1980, exit discrimination
had a larger effect on career earnings ($808,000) than the more widely
noted finding of wage discrimination (329,000). Overall, wage and exit
discrimination together costs black players more than $1 million in relin-
quished wages. Furthermore, if career length is a factor in determining
postcareer earnings, $808,000 is an underestimate of the lifetime effect of
exit discrimination. A shortened career affords less endorsement and bas-
ketball-related opportunities after the playing days are over.
Summary. On the surface, the labor market in professional sports
would appear to be one of the least likely arenas in which to find racial
discrimination. It has been almost half a century, for example, since
Chuck Cooper became the first black basketball player to cross the color
barrier by signing with the Boston Celtics. Since that time, blacks have
made significant inroads into professional sports. Black players have
come to constitute roughly 80 percent of the NBA, and the 13 highest paid
players in the league were black in 1995 (Dallas Morning News, Dec. 24,
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pay comes from setting the race variable to 1 (0) in the Kahn and Sherer model. This gives us the first two
points on the graph (the points above zero tenure). Fourth, the same calculations are repeated for the 1-year
veteran measures using the next year’s performance statistics, setting the tenure variable to 1 and using the
correct measure of NBA wage inflation, which averaged about 13 percent per season throughout the 1980s.
This method takes all the players of a certain vintage, places the beginning of their careers at 1980, and cre-
ates a standard player. Then we vary the race and measure predicted pay, controlling for on-the-court
productivity.
FIGURE 3
A Comparison of the Effect of Wage and Exit Discrimination on Career Earnings
1995). However, as our findings show, exit discrimination is an important
source of inequity despite apparent substantial progress. This study shows
that for players with average performance levels, a black player can
expect to play 5.5 years, whereas a white player can expect to play for 7.5
years. The value of this gap ($808,000) is greater than the value of the
wage gap ($329,000), emphasizing the importance of job duration, not
just wages, in understanding discrimination in this industry.28
Our results compare favorably with Jiobu (1988). In his study, Major
League Baseball consisted of 25 percent black players and 61 percent
white players in comparison with the NBA, which was 82 percent black
during the time frame of our study. Comparable with our 36 percent find-
ing, his results show, on further calculation, that being black increased
career mortality by 28 percent. This is consistent with the idea that
increases in the percentage of black players (on a team and in the avail-
able talent pool) lead to higher retention rates for whites.
Why does exit discrimination exist? We found that the racial composi-
tion of teams was affected by the racial composition of the metropolitan
area in which the team played. There is a significant positive relationship
between the percentage of citizens who are white and the percentage of
players who are white within a given city, and this, in turn, has an impor-
tant effect on attendance. The race of the coach and general manager were
not significantly related to the team racial composition, providing further
evidence that customer, not employer, discrimination is the source of the
exit discrimination.
Implications. This research adds to the discrimination literature by
(1) analyzing another form of discrimination (exit) that has mostly been
ignored, (2) showing the value of wage discrimination in a comparison
with the exit discrimination effect on career earnings, and (3) providing
an examination of the sources of the discrimination. The results of these
analyses have two wider implications for the study of labor market dis-
crimination. First, exit discrimination in the general labor market
demands greater empirical attention than heretofore received. As we
have shown here, even while controlling for individual productivity, a
key personnel decision in the NBA was influenced by the player’s race.
Moreover, the significance of exit discrimination in terms of its effect on
career earnings was found to be greater than that attributed to wage
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28 The career earnings effect was for a player beginning his career in 1980. In today’s market, the average
salary is just over $2 million (Dallas Morning News, Dec. 24, 1995). If exit discrimination is worth about 2
years of pay, this amounts to approximately $4 million of lost income for an average black player.
discrimination. More generally, translating the effect into dollar terms
underscores the importance of examining disparities in lifetime earnings
between racial or gender groups.
To be sure, the sports context provides a relatively pure case for the
study of exit discrimination. Isolating the effects of involuntary exit from
voluntary exits will be an important next step in extending this work to the
broader labor market context. Another challenge for future research will
be to examine how exit discrimination is affected by other ex ante
processes, including hiring and the structure of promotion ladders within
an organization (Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby, 1986).
A second implication of this work is that customer preferences or
prejudices may be an important determinant of labor market discrimina-
tion. While we focus on exit, race is likely to be an important factor at
the points of entry and promotion when there is consumer-producer con-
tact. For example, the race of the service provider may be important in
judgments about the quality of customer service and may in turn influ-
ence hiring decisions. In the case of the NBA, preferences for whites
may be based on the greater entertainment value that fans receive from
watching a white versus a black player. Our results provide evidence in
support of Kahn’s (1991b) model that shows that customer discrimina-
tion can persist in markets where there is contact between consumer and
producer. The results of this study suggest that workers in the entertain-
ment and service industries are particularly vulnerable to customer
discrimination.
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